On November 7, 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi issued an explicit statement regarding Tokyo's potential military response if China were to attack Taiwan.
This statement was widely regarded as crossing Beijing's 'red line,' triggering escalating tensions that threaten to turn the Taiwan Strait into a prolonged conflict hotspot.
Should the Taiwan Strait—a vital logistics channel—be paralyzed, 40% of Asia's electronics supply chain would be disrupted, meaning the prices of mobile phones and auto parts in Indonesia could skyrocket.
The irony is stark: amidst this growing crisis, an Indonesian delegation led by Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Foreign Minister Sugiono was in Tokyo on November 17, 2025, for a 2+2 meeting.
This visit, aimed at strengthening strategic cooperation, including an increased Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), had to proceed under the shadow of rising regional tensions.
The delegation's presence in Tokyo amidst the escalation reveals that Indonesia is forced to walk a geopolitical tightrope: strengthening partnership with Japan, crucial for the modernization of its defense equipment, while simultaneously ensuring stable relations with China, a key strategic economic partner.
Against this highly sensitive backdrop, a recording of a phone conversation between President Prabowo Subianto and Defense Minister Sjamsoeddin circulated in late November 2025. The President's directive was clear: maintain good relations with China and firmly assert that Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair, just as Papua is Indonesia's internal affair.
Some speculated that the instruction was related to domestic political issues. Such interpretations, however, are misleading and overly narrow. The president’s message should be understood as a high-level strategic directive aimed at managing geopolitical risk.
The Taiwan issue represents Beijing’s most sensitive strategic concern, while for Tokyo it is closely linked to shipping lanes and regional security.
Thus, the president’s direct communication with the defense minister reflects Indonesia’s broader grand strategy: maintaining an active and non-aligned foreign policy, refusing to be drawn into bloc politics, and prioritizing regional stability. This is the posture of a state seeking to act as a balancer amid intensifying great-power rivalry.
The One China Gambit
To safeguard regional stability, Indonesia must take adaptive and constructive steps. Unchecked, the Japan-China tension could spill over into the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and disrupt critical logistics routes across Southeast Asia.
President Prabowo’s instruction to Sjamsoeddin can be distilled into three core directives, forming a framework for risk mitigation with the One China Policy at its center.
First, Indonesia must strengthen its relations with China as a preventive measure. Stable bilateral ties serve as a crucial buffer against pressure from competing blocs.
Second, Jakarta must heighten strategic vigilance regarding developments in Japan–China relations.
Third, Indonesia must ensure consistency in its stance on sensitive issues, particularly as defense and diplomatic engagement with Japan deepens.
This gambit is critical. If Beijing perceives inconsistency in Indonesia’s adherence to the One China Policy, enhanced defense cooperation with Japan could be interpreted as alignment with Western strategic interests.
In such a scenario, Indonesia risks either losing access to advanced Japanese technology and investment or undermining its vital economic partnership with China.
Through this approach, Indonesia seeks to position itself as a stabilizing force. This is the most constructive role a country of Indonesia’s size can play amid rivalry between major powers.
Indonesia’s credibility as a regional stabilizer depends entirely on foreign policy consistency. President Prabowo’s firm directive regarding Taiwan sends a strong signal of that consistency.
Time for ASEAN Action
Rising tensions in East Asia also serve as a wake-up call for Indonesia to reinforce ASEAN centrality. Jakarta should leverage its leadership role to push for more active regional security dialogue.
One constructive step would be for Indonesia to urge ASEAN to convene an emergency consultation at the foreign ministerial or even head-of-state level, involving not only Japan and China but other regional maritime powers.
Such a consultation would be vital to formulate an updated regional maritime code of conduct. Existing frameworks must adapt to new military dynamics, including drones, cyberwarfare, and increasingly assertive “gray zone” operations in the South China Sea, frequently highlighted in regional security assessments.
Indonesia must ensure that ASEAN remains a central and relevant actor, rather than a passive observer.
Viewed in this context, the essence of President Prabowo’s directive becomes clear. His assertion that Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair reflects Indonesia’s long-standing adherence to the One China Policy, which it has upheld since 1950.
For Jakarta, Taiwan is an important economic partner, but Indonesia does not recognize it as a sovereign state, in line with the position held by the majority of the international community.
The One China Policy remains the cornerstone of Indonesia–China relations and the guiding principle for Jakarta’s response to the Taiwan issue. Reaffirming this stance is an effort to maintain principled consistency.
Ultimately, the Japan–China tensions of late 2025 highlight the region’s growing fragility.
Indonesia, through President Prabowo’s directive and subsequent diplomacy, is striving to preserve strategic equilibrium.
Prabowo’s phone instruction is more than a momentary directive.
It is a stark reminder that amid geopolitical turbulence, the One China Policy serves as Indonesia’s final anchor.
Losing that anchor would not mean choosing a bloc—it would mean forfeiting the moral sovereignty needed to negotiate with any side.
*) Rioberto Sidauruk is an expert staff at Commission VII of the House of Representatives and an analyst on national strategic policies.
The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of ANTARA News Agency.
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